Singularities in Inflationary Cosmology: A Review by Borde, Arvind & Vilenkin, Alexander
ar
X
iv
:g
r-q
c/
96
12
03
6v
1 
 1
5 
D
ec
 1
99
6
To appear in the Proceedings of the Sixth Quantum Gravity Seminar, Moscow.
Singularities in Inflationary Cosmology: A Review
Arvind Borde†∗ and Alexander Vilenkin⋆
Institute of Cosmology
Department of Physics and Astronomy
Tufts University
Medford, MA 02155, USA.
Abstract: We review here some recent results that show that inflationary
cosmological models must contain initial singularities. We also present a
new singularity theorem. The question of the initial singularity re-emerges
in inflationary cosmology because inflation is known to be generically future-
eternal. It is natural to ask, therefore, if inflationary models can be
continued into the infinite past in a non-singular way. The results that
we discuss show that the answer to the question is “no.” This means that
we cannot use inflation as a way of avoiding the question of the birth of the
Universe. We also argue that our new theorem suggests – in a sense that
we explain in the paper – that the Universe cannot be infinitely old.
I. Introduction
Inflationary cosmological models appear, at first glance, to admit the possibility
that the Universe might be described by a version of the steady-state picture.
The possibility seems to arise because inflation is generically future-eternal:
in a large class of inflationary cosmological models the Universe consists of
a number of isolated thermalized regions embedded in an always-inflating
background [1]. The boundaries of the thermalized regions expand into this
background, but the inflating domains that separate them expand even faster,
and the thermalized regions do not, in general, merge. As previously created
regions expand, new ones come into existence, but the Universe does not fill
up entirely with thermalized regions [2–4]. A cosmological model in which the
inflationary phase has no global end and continually produces new “islands of
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thermalization” naturally leads to this question: can the model be extended in
a non-singular way into the infinite past, avoiding in this way the problem of
the initial singularity? The Universe would then be in a steady state of eternal
inflation without a beginning.
Assuming that some rather general conditions are met, we have recently
shown [5–8] that the answer to this question is “no”: generic inflationary models
necessarily contain initial singularities. This is significant, for it forces us in
inflationary cosmologies (as in the standard big-bang ones) to face the question
of what, if anything, came before.
This paper reviews what is known about the existence of singularities in
inflationary cosmology. A partial answer to the singularity question was pre-
viously given by Vilenkin [9] who showed the necessity of a beginning in a
two-dimensional spacetime and gave a plausibility argument for four dimen-
sions. The broad question was also previously addressed by Borde [10] who
sketched a general proof using the Penrose-Hawking-Geroch global techniques.
We will not discuss this earlier work here, concentrating instead on more recent
results.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II outlines some mathematical
background (see Hawking and Ellis [11] for details). Section III describes our
first theorem, applicable to open Universes with a simple causal structure.
Section IV sketches how the theorem may be extended to closed Universes.
Section V presents a new theorem: Here, we drop the assumption that the causal
structure of the Universe is simple. Instead, we introduce a new condition,
which we call the limited influence condition. We argue that this condition
is likely to hold in many inflationary models. Our new theorem makes no
assumptions about whether the Universe is open or closed, thus providing a
unified treatment of the two cases. Section VI offers some concluding comments.
II. Mathematical Preliminaries
Spacetime is represented by a manifold M with a time-oriented [12] Lorentz
metric gab of signature (−,+,+,+). We do not assume any specific field
equation for gab. Instead, we impose an inequality on the Ricci curvature
(called a convergence condition), and our conclusions are valid in any theory of
gravity (such as Einstein’s, with a physically reasonable source) in which such
a condition is satisfied.
A curve is called causal if it is everywhere either timelike or null. The
causal and chronological pasts of a point p, denoted respectively by J−(p) and
I−(p), are defined as follows:
J−(p) = {q : ∃ a future-directed causal curve from q to p},
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and
I−(p) = {q : ∃ a future-directed timelike curve from q to p}.
The futures J+(p) and I+(p) are defined similarly. The sets I±(p) are open:
i.e., if x ∈ I±(p), then all points in some neighborhood of x also lie in I±(p).
The past light cone of p is defined [6] as E−(p) = J−(p) − I−(p). It follows
that E−(p) is achronal (i.e., no two points on it can be connected by a timelike
curve) and that E−(p) ⊂ I˙−(p) (where I˙−(p) is the boundary of I−(p)). In
general, however, E−(p) 6= I˙−(p) (see fig. 1). These definitions of futures, pasts,
and light cones can be extended from single points p to arbitrary spacetime sets
in a straightforward manner.
Spacetimes in which E−(p) = I˙−(p), for all points p, are called past causally
simple. We tighten this definition by further requiring that E−(p) 6= ∅ (this
rules out certain causality violations).
p
q
E−(p)
I˙−(p)− E−(p) 6= ∅
Figure 1: An example of the causal complications that can arise in an
unrestricted spacetime. Light rays travel along 45◦ lines in this diagram,
and the two thick horizontal lines are identified. This allows the point q to
send a signal to the point p along the dashed line, as shown, even though q
lies outside what is usually considered the past light cone of p. The boundary
of the past of p, I˙−(p), then consists of the past light cone of p, E−(p), plus
a further piece. Such a spacetime is not “causally simple.”
A timelike curve is maximally extended in the past direction if it has no
past endpoint. (Such a curve is often called past-inextendible.) The idea behind
this is that such a curve is fully extended in the past direction, and is not merely
a segment of some other curve.
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We define a closed Universe as one that contains a compact, edgeless,
achronal hypersurface, and an open Universe as one that contains no such
surface.
The strong causality condition holds onM if there are no closed or “almost-
closed” timelike or null curves through any point of M. If µ is any timelike
curve in a spacetime that obeys the strong causality condition and x is any
point not on µ, then there must be some neighborhood N of x that does not
intersect µ. (Otherwise, µ would accumulate at x, and thereby give an almost-
closed timelike curve.)
Finally, consider a congruence [13] of null geodesics with affine parameter v
and tangent V a. The expansion of the geodesics may be defined as θ ≡ DaV a,
where Da is the covariant derivative. The propagation equation for θ leads to
this inequality:
dθ
dv
≤ −1
2
θ2 −RabV aV b . (1)
Suppose that (i) RabV
aV b ≥ 0 for all null vectors V a (this is called the null
convergence condition), (ii) the expansion, θ, is negative at some point v = v0
on a geodesic γ, and (iii) γ is complete in the direction of increasing v (i.e.,
γ is defined for all v ≥ v0). Then θ → −∞ along γ a finite affine parameter
distance from v0 [11, 14].
III. Open Universes
Our first result [5, 7] applies to open, causally simple spacetimes:
Theorem 1: A spacetime M cannot be null-geodesically complete to the past
if it satisfies the following conditions:
A. It is past causally simple.
B. It is open.
C. It obeys the null convergence condition.
D. It has at least one point p such that for every point q to the past of p the
volume of the difference of the pasts of p and q is finite.
Assumptions A–C are conventional as far as work on singularity theorems
goes. But assumption D is new and is inflation-specific. A slightly different
version has been discussed in detail elsewhere [9, 7], but here is a rough, short
explanation: It may be shown that if a point r lies in a thermalized region,
then all points in I+(r) also lie in that thermalized region [5]. Therefore,
given a point p in the inflating region, all points in its past must lie in the
inflating region. Further, it seems plausible that there is a zero probability
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for no thermalized regions to form in an infinite spacetime volume. Then
assumption D follows.
Proof: The full proof of this result is available elsewhere [5, 7], but here is
a sketch: Suppose that M is null-complete to the past. We show that a
contradiction follows.
Let q be a point to the past of the point p of assumption D. Then every
past-directed null geodesic from q must leave E−(q) at some point and enter
I−(q) (i.e., it must leave the past null cone of q and enter the interior of the past
of q). For, let γ be a past-directed null geodesic from q, and suppose that γ lies
in E−(q) throughout. Choose a small “triangle” of null geodesics neighboring γ
in E−(q) and construct a volume “wedge” by moving the triangle so that its
vertex moves from q to a point q′ (still in I−(p)), an infinitesimal distance to
the future of q. The volume of this region may be expressed [5, 7] as
∆
∫ ∞
0
A(v) dv,
where ∆ is a constant, A is the cross-sectional area of E−(q) in the wedge,
and v is an affine parameter along the geodesic (chosen to increase in the past
direction). From assumption D, this volume (being a part of the volume of
I−(p)− I−(q)) must be finite. This can happen only if A decreases somewhere.
But
dA
dv
= θA,
where θ is the divergence of the congruence of null geodesics that make up our
volume wedge. Therefore, θ must become negative somewhere. We have seen
that assumption C then implies that θ → −∞ within a finite affine parameter
distance. It follows from this (by a standard argument [11]) that γ must leave
E−(q) and enter I−(q), a finite affine parameter distance from q.
Now, this holds for any geodesic γ that lies in E−(q) sufficiently far to the
past. Thus E−(q) is compact. But assumption A implies that E−(q) has no
edge. These two statements taken together contradict assumption B.
IV. Closed Universes
Closed Universes are potentially awkward for our theorem because it is possible
for light cones in some closed Universes to “wrap around” the whole Universe,
and thus be compact, without causing any problems. This is illustrated in
fig. 2 [15]. Such behavior is unreasonable, however, in the context of most
5
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Figure 2: A closed Universe in which the past light cone of any point q is
compact (and the volume of the difference of the pasts of any two points is
finite). The past-directed null geodesics from q start off initially in E−(q);
but, once they recross at r (“at the back”) they enter I−(q) (because there
are timelike curves between q and points on these null geodesics past r),
and they thus leave E−(q).
inflationary cosmological models, which are “spatially large” in the sense that
they contain many different regions that are not in causal communication.
We define a localized light cone as one that does not wrap around the
Universe. More precisely, we say that a past light cone is localized if from every
spacetime point p not on the cone there is at least one timelike curve, maximally
extended in the past direction, that does not intersect the cone [16]. It turns
out that the conclusion of our theorem still holds if we replace assumption B
by the assumption that past light cones are localized [6].
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V. Causally Complicated Universes
The assumption of causal simplicity – made in our first result in order to simplify
the proof – can be dropped, as long as we are willing to make a replacement
assumption about the causal structure of inflating spacetimes. The new theorem
embraces topologically and causally complicated spacetimes, and it allows us
to give a unified treatment of open and closed Universes.
Theorem 2: A spacetime M cannot be null-geodesically complete to the past
if it satisfies the following conditions:
A. It obeys the null convergence condition.
B. It obeys the strong causality condition.
C. It has at least one point p such that
i. for every point q to the past of p the volume of the difference of the
pasts of p and q is finite (i.e., Ω(I−(p)− I−(q)) <∞), and
ii. there is a timelike curve µ, maximally extended to the past of p, such
that the boundary of the future of µ has a non-empty intersection with
the past of p (i.e., I˙+(µ) ∩ I−(p) 6= ∅).
Part (ii) of assumption C is new. It is related to certain other causal and
topological properties of spacetimes [8], and there are also physical reasons for
believing that the assumption is reasonable. Consider, for instance, a point r
in the inflating region. Suppose that its past, I−(r), has the property that it
“swallows the Universe,” in the sense that every timelike curve that is maximally
extended in the past direction eventually enters I−(r). (This is related to the
issue of localization of light cones discussed above.) Assuming that there are
thermalization events arbitrarily far in the past, it seems likely, then, that
there is a thermalization event somewhere in I−(r). This contradicts the fact
that r lies in the inflating region [5]. It is plausible, therefore, that inflating
spacetimes will, in general, have the property that there exist maximally
extended (in the past direction) timelike curves whose futures do not encompass
the whole inflating region. (If no timelike curve has a future that encompasses
the entire inflating region, it will guarantee that the Universe never completely
thermalizes – so one may view a condition of this sort as a sufficient condition
for inflation to be future-eternal.)
Another piece of evidence for the reasonableness of part (ii) of assumption C
is that the spacetime in the past light cone of any point in the inflating region is
locally approximately de Sitter. It is similar to the spacetime in the future light
cone of a point in an inflating universe where there is no thermalization. Thus
“past infinity” in inflating regions might be expected to be similar to that of
de Sitter space, where the sort of behavior we are talking about does occur [11].
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We are arguing, in other words, that a typical maximally extended past-
directed curve ought not to influence the entire inflating region – there must
be portions of the region that do not lie to the future of such a curve. This is
illustrated in fig. 3. Let V be a spacetime region. We call a timelike curve, µ, a
curve of limited influence in V if its future does not engulf all of V . If V is the
inflating region of a spacetimeM, and if all timelike curves inM are of limited
influence in V , we say that the spacetime obeys the limited influence condition.
µ
(a)
µ
(b)
Figure 3: These figures each represent the inflating region of some space-
time. The shaded region in each case represents the future of the curve µ.
In (a) µ can influence the entire inflating region, whereas in (b) it cannot.
Proof: Suppose that M is null-complete to the past. We show that this leads
to a contradiction.
Let q be a point to the past of the point p of assumption C. We have seen
in Theorem 1 that every past-directed null geodesic from q must leave E−(q)
at some point and enter I−(q) (i.e., it must leave the past null cone of q and
enter the interior of the past of q).
Let the point q belong to I˙+(µ)∩I−(p) (see fig. 4). Let γ be a null geodesic
through q that lies on I˙+(µ). From assumption B it follows that this geodesic
cannot leave I˙+(µ) when followed in the past direction. For, suppose it does at
some point x. This point cannot lie on µ itself (because then it, and all points
to its causal future, including q, will lie to the chronological future of some
point on µ, i.e., in I+(µ) and not on its boundary). Pick a neighborhood N
of x that does not intersect µ anywhere (see the discussion of strong causality
in Section II). There will be some null geodesic in N , past-directed from x, that
lies on the boundary I˙+(µ). If this geodesic, λ, is other than the continuation
of γ, there will be a timelike curve from it to a point on γ (see fig. 5), violating
the achronal nature of the boundary I˙+(µ).
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pµ
q
γ
I−(p)
I˙+(µ)
Figure 4: The null geodesic γ, past-directed from q, lies both on I˙+(µ)
and on E−(q). It must lie on I˙+(µ) throughout when followed into the
past (the hollow circle at the “past end” of µ is not part of the spacetime).
But q ∈ I−(p), so γ must enter I−(q). This contradicts the fact that it lies
on I˙+(µ) throughout.
N
x
γ
λ
Figure 5: If the null geodesic γ encounters at x some other geodesic λ,
then there will be a timelike curve – shown by the dashed line – between
the two.
Now, we have seen that γ must leave E−(q) and enter I−(q); i.e., there
must be a point r to the past of q on γ such that r ∈ I−(q). This means that
every point in some neighborhood of r must also lie in I−(q). Some of these
points must belong to I+(µ). (The point r lies on γ, and so belongs to I˙+(µ),
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the boundary of the future of µ. Therefore, there must be points close to r that
lie in I+(µ).) This means that there is a timelike curve that starts in the past
at some point on µ, passes through a point close to r, and then continues on
to q. This contradicts the fact that q ∈ I˙+(µ).
VI. Discussion
The theorems in this paper show that inflation does not seem to remove
the problem of the initial singularity (although it does move the singularity
back into an indefinite past). In fact, our analysis of the assumptions of the
theorems suggests that almost all points in the inflating region have a singularity
somewhere in their pasts. In this sense, our results are stronger than most of
the usual singularity theorems, which – in general – predict the existence of
just one incomplete geodesic [17].
Indeed, Theorem 2 is even stronger than that, since it appears to suggest
that the Universe cannot be infinitely old, in the sense that the inflating region
of spacetime can contain no timelike curve infinitely long (in proper time) in the
past direction [18]. For, suppose such a curve, µ, does exist. It seems reasonable
to suppose that the null geodesics that lie on the boundary of the future of µ
are also complete in the past direction [19]. If this is the case, and if µ is of
limited influence in the inflating region, we arrive at the same contradiction as
the one in our theorem [20].
The existence of initial singularities in inflationary models means that we
cannot use inflation as a way of avoiding the question of the birth of the Uni-
verse. The question will probably have to be answered quantum mechanically,
i.e., by describing the Universe by a wave function, and not by a classical space-
time.
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